That they were too modest about their achievements to be strictly accurate has been shown by recent scholarship. Whilst the role of historians prior to and during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the degree to which they succeeded -or failed -to shape decisionmaking have been examined in considerable depth and detail, the reverse of the coin has been given but the most cursory of glances. And yet the effect of the war on historical scholarship was profound. Not the least, it stimulated the final emergence of diplomatic history as a distinct field of academic research, led by scholars who had served in wartime intelligence. This interplay between academia and officialdom, the complex and reciprocal relationship between dons working for government and the effect of that experience on their scholarly pursuit after the war is the subject of what follows. Given the nature of this collection of essays, the focus will be largely on international historians and scholars of the nascent international relations discipline. 4 *** Britain went to war unprepared for what lay ahead. For British academia, especially scholars in the humanities, the war was a profound shock. For a generation or two, Germany -the Germany of Jena and Göttingen, of Heidelberg and Tübingen rather than the Potsdam parade ground -had been a beacon of excellence for the liberal intelligentsia. Many of them had made the obligatory pilgrimage to seats of learning in Germany, had taken a deep draught of Wagner's heady brew, and followed German scholarship ever after. 5 grasp of recent, let alone contemporary, history. It was, the President of the Royal Historical Society had noted ten years earlier, 'as if we regarded the year 1815 as bringing a great historical epoch to a close, but not as being the commencement of a new and equally important period.' 6 The summer of 1914 shattered any such illusions of the nirvana of a never-ending present. Whatever their scholarly scruples or their remoteness from current affairs, historians took to writing about the conflict now unfolding on the continent. Indeed, the war reinforced a conviction that history somehow mattered, that insights derived from its study had vital practical significance. A.F. Pollard, Professor of Constitutional History at University College London and editor of History, articulated this rediscovered sense of mission in the inaugural issue of that journal. It was to bring 'the light of history to bear on the study of politics', and to help to judge 'modern experiment by historical experience.' 7 Between 1914 and 1919 that light was shone through 'war histories', mostly in the shape of propaganda pamphlets, and through employment in Whitehall. These two branches of activity were entwined, and some historians contributed to both. As for propaganda, one prolific pamphleteer, F.J.C. Hearnshaw of King's College London, reflected after the war with a degree of contrition that it had been misguided and largely unsuccessful, and that '[t]o treat of it would be a painful and almost indecent task.' 8 More recent generations of historians, unencumbered by such delicacy and gifted with a higher toleration of pain, have found in these literary productions a rich seam of material that helps to elucidate the shifting attitudes towards the 6.G.W. Prothero, 'Presidential Address', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society XVIII (1904), 12. Prothero had taken the trouble to discover whether recent history was taught in continental universities. It was!, see replies by Pflugk-Hartung, 27 Jan., Boutmy, 29 Jan., and Fournier, 5 Feb. 1904, Prothero MSS, Royal Historical Society, PP2/III/4. enemy powers and Britain's role in Europe. The most effective general statement of Britain's case, the case of liberal Edwardian England, against Germany and the Central Powers was made in Why We Are at War. Written by half-a-dozen Oxford historians and rushed into print by Clarendon Press in mid-September 1914, it went through seven imprints and two revisions before the middle of the following month and received wider dissemination still following its translation into several foreign languages. Some 120 pages long but with an even longer appendix, consisting of official documents published by the belligerent powers, the book inaugurated a series of further Oxford Pamphlets, and it set the tone of this type of literature. 9 It was the intention of the Oxford Six 'to set forth the causes of the present war, and the principles which we believe to be at stake.' For this task they had 'some experience in the handling of historic [sic] evidence, and we have endeavoured to treat the subject historically.' Indeed, weaned on the set texts of the literae humaniores or reared on Stubb's Charters if they were history graduates, the work was remarkable for its heavy reliance on the so-called 'colour books', collections of official documents published by the belligerent governments to justify their positions. Britain's commitment to France was accepted as axiomatic. In taking up arms to defend Belgium, meanwhile, 'we fight for the law of nations; that is, ultimately, for the peace of all nations and for the right of the weaker to exist.' More difficult to treat was the role of Russia, the war-time alliance with whom sat uneasily with pre-war sensibilities. Since 1890, the six Oxford historians averred, Russia had acted 'in close accord with the desires of national (Oxford, 3rd ed. 1914) . Translations were brought out at the same time, see e.g. Warum Wir Krieg Führen: Grossbritanniens Rechtsstandpunkt (Oxford, 1914) [note the emphasis on law in the title] and Grundene til Englands Deltagelse i Krigen (Oxford, 1914) . Admirably unrestrained is the analysis offered by S. Wallace, War and the Image of Germany: British Academia, 1914 -1918 (Edinburgh, 1988 , 58-73 et passim.
Russia was the first great power to mobilise in 1914, 'she took the step in consequence of German threats.' 10 There was considerable variation amongst the 'war histories' that followed where Why We Are at War had led. Not all of them strove to strike the same judicious tone. The book nevertheless established the broad parameters of public discourse on the war. Britain had to defend France and the smaller nations of Europe, whose rights had to be safeguarded. Russia was acknowledged, albeit often warily, as a civilised, quasi-Western power, whereas Germany had sloughed off the veneer of civilisation, and her innate militarism was identified as one of the root causes of the war. German belligerence, indeed, was treated as the outward manifestation of German philosophy. To that extent, observed one of its authors, H.W.C.
Davis 11 , 'German political theory [was] a deeper cause of the European war.' 12 The notion had taken hold of 'Harry' Davis, one of the foremost mediaevalists of the day. He interrupted his work editing Anglo-Norman charters and by the end of 1914 had produced a study on the political views of Heinrich von Treitschke, the principal exponent of ultra-nationalism amongst the German historical profession. Before the war, Treitschke, who had died in 1896, was respected for his scholarship. But his British colleagues had viewed his writings on political matters with the bemused aloofness of an amateur botanist observing the antics of some exotic beetle. '[A]n historian, however great, is not always a safe guide in politics', one of them had concluded in 1904. 13 The war changed that; and, together with Friedrich Nietzsche and 10. Why We Are at War, 5, 14-5, 52, 56, and 79. While Davis had refrained from polemics, younger scholars were less inhibited. One of them was his fellow-Balliol historian Arnold J. Toynbee 15 , whose Nationality and the War was avowedly political. A trained classicist, already as an undergraduate Toynbee had developed an interest in international politics, and more especially the affairs of the Near East and the Balkans. 16 To his mind the war was the outcome of 'national questions'. Indeed, 'the riddle of Nationality [had] become an affair of life and death.' The book showed traces of Toynbee's later penchant for the epigrammatic: '[t]he living generation of Germans is suffering for a thousand years of history.' But in content and diction it was very much the product of Liberal, upper-class Edwardian England, combining concern for the principle of nationality, albeit not unadulterated, with a sublime confidence in the beneficent, for enlightened, force of the British Empire. Its five hundred-odd pages were an early indication of Toynbee's ability rapidly to 14 scale it has brigaded them inexorably with the German group.' The answer, then, was for all of rump-Austria to join Germany 'as a single unit, on condition that she grants Home Rule within this district [Bohemia and Moravia] to the whole Tchech nationality.' A new Germany, reconstituted along federal lines, and with the nationality principle used fairly as much to her advantage as to her detriment, was an indispensable part of any lasting post-war settlement. It was this that a future peace conference had to attempt, rather 'like the Vienna Congress a century ago.' 19 Toynbee's suggestions regarding an eventual peace settlement were by no means free from contradictions. While he wished for Germany to join the Allies in 'organising some international authority', he was vague on the nature of such a body. He stressed that 'we cannot simply deposit our document in some international "Ark of Covenant" and go our ways'; and that treaties were 'lifeless', unless administered by 'a living organ with executive power, ... with sovereign authority.' And yet he did not envisage this international body to have such powers; it commonwealths' that would emerge 'to preserve the Pacific from Chinese domination.' The suggestion that Russia would be 'the chief promoter' of this combination, by contrast, seems less surefooted. 22 Toynbee's concluding reference to ancient Greece is instructive, for as an historian of antiquity and as a student of current affairs Toynbee was influenced by the classicist A.E.
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Zimmern. 23 A tutor at New College, then the fountain-head of Greek studies, Zimmern had taught the undergraduate Toynbee, who found his lectures 'immensely stimulating; and I had a warm affection and regard for him as a friend.' 24 Zimmern was a Hellenist, who believed in the benefits of a historical education. Those trained in the discipline were not 'ready with quick remedies for present difficulties: for history supplies no rules for the solution of her problems.
But she has in store ... a more precious gift -eyes to see and understand and unshaken courage to face and master them.' 25 What made Zimmern's lectures remarkable was his ability to connect the Graeco-Roman world with the present, without resorting to crude over-simplifications. 26 The work for which he is best known, The Greek Commonwealth, was 'an attempt to make clear to myself what fifth-century Athens was really like.' 27 'a guide to the study of the underlying causes and issues of the war.' The present was 'a testing time for Democracy', and the task before Europe was a double one -the practical one of restoring peace, and the intellectual one of creating 'true internationalism'. 32 Zimmern, too, drew a sharp distinction between Prussia and 'real Germany', which was an 'integral part of the civilisation of Western Europe' and whose people were 'very similar to their neighbours of kindred stock'. But they had 'been indoctrinated and Prussianised not only into acquiescence, but into sympathy with the policy of its rulers.' The outlook of Prussia's ruling caste was alien to 'Western habits of thought', but its 'domineering spirit' now shaped German foreign policy. 33 The war was thus 'a war of ideas.' Germany had to be defeated, but Zimmern was wary of the nationality principle. Establishing a 'civil society' was more important than creating nation states, which always bore within them the seeds of oppression of minorities. This was Britain's historic task, for she was 'at once the freest, the largest, and the most vigorous' of the powers. The large number of intelligence officials with a historical education is striking but not surprising. For one thing, 'Greats' and the Modern History course still dominated the scene at Oxford, and at Cambridge the Historical Tripos was not far behind in influence, even its prestige did not match that of the Natural Sciences there. Graduates with some background in history were thus more common than pearls in oysters. For another, it was still generally accepted that a historical education equipped future civil servants and political leaders with the habits of mind necessary for dealing with the problems of imperial administration and strategic policy-making. 39 That professional historians were drafted into war-time intelligence agencies was only to be expected then. Given their shared educational backgrounds, many of them were known, either by reputation or in person, to Whitehall mandarins. Trained, moreover, to contextualise and scrutinise documents, used to dealing with the often doubtful and fragmentary nature of extant evidence, and often possessing extensive linguistic skills and knowledge of foreign countries, they had the necessary attributes for intelligence work and policy advice.
Since German was still the lingua franca of academia in the long nineteenth century, most of them spoke and read the language fluently; and not a few had spent some time studying at German universities. This applied, incidentally, more especially to Graecists, Latinists and papyrologists, many of whom found a niche in code-breaking, most notably Frank Adcock, F.M. Cornford and Dillwyn Knox. 40 the belligerents had settled down to a war of attrition. Others had enlisted early in the war, to be redeployed in intelligence roles later, often on being deemed unfit for active service.
As the war ground on, these scholars-turned-civil servants proved their worth in cryptanalysis, trade intelligence and propaganda. But it also became clear that their expertise and skills could be used more effectively still. At some point the war was going to end; and, though no-one could yet know when and how it would be terminated, Britain had to be prepared for that eventuality. With this in mind Toynbee and Zimmern suggested, in January 1917, a scheme for a new intelligence section. Its specific remit was to 'to collect, organise, and present all the relevant facts' in a systematic manner, so as to create a sound basis of economic, ethnographic and political information regarding the territories likely to be affected by one or both groups of belligerents. It was an exercise in evidence-based decision-making: 'Whichever party is in possession of the most detailed knowledge regarding economic and political facts, the plans of the enemy, and the bearing of these facts upon their own, will have a formidable advantage over its opponents in making peace.' 41 At the same time, a historian in military intelligence, H.W.V. Temperley 42 , pushed a similar scheme on a sympathetic Leo Amery, then a parliamentary private secretary in the Lloyd George coalition: 'Temperley came in with a suggestion that we should have a small historical staff to look into the past history of some of the debatable questions, more particularly the Balkans and Poland, which will come up at the Peace Conference.' 43 There is no evidence that the three historians had coordinated their moves.
Temperley had, at any rate, come to the view that a more strategic approach to war-time foreign 41 policy was needed: 'The political side of strategy requires a knowledge which cannot be improvised and is based on the study of history and a considerable acquaintance with contemporary politics, economics, and diplomacy. ' 44 In the course of 1917, separate developments converged to make the establishment of a political intelligence section possible. One was the incontrovertible need for more systemic evidence gathering and analysis. In Whitehall this might not have counted for much, had it not Indeed, using his many familial and professional connections he also advised on British press campaigns in the United States. 52
As a Whitehall operator Prothero lacked the necessary guile and cunning to defend his own corner. There was continuous friction with his immediate superior, and there were run-ins with the India Office over demarcation disputes between its peace preparations and those undertaken by the Historical Section. Ultimately, Prothero's innate stubbornness and Hardinge's support helped him prevail. In early 1918, the transfer of his section to the Foreign Office as part of its Library establishment was complete, and the section's head was now free to concentrate on the production of his 'manuals'. 53 Prothero acted as a kind of literary impresario, a role for which his nearly two decades at the helm of the Quarterly had predestined him. He drafted in a wide range of talent and experts, exceedingly well informed about far-away countries of which, as a rule, their political masters knew little. 59 Among the writers obtained from Temperley's section were C.K. (later Sir Charles) Webster 60 and E.L. (later Sir Llewellyn) Woodward. 61 Webster had been a protégé of Temperley's at Cambridge, and both were close friends. They had begun to carve out a niche for themselves as specialists in diplomatic history in the last few years before 1914, Webster more especially as the leading expert on Castlereagh's foreign policy. A clutch of learned papers on it earned him a chair at Liverpool at the ridiculously young age of twenty-eight. 62 In its outline, it differed from the usual 'P. books', though its main emphasis was always on practicalities. Webster laid particular stress on the international circumstances during the two years prior to the congress, before discussing in considerable detail the organisation of the congress and its proceedings. Although the 1815 settlement had shortcomings, its architects were focused on the 'possibilities of safeguarding the new Europe from aggression.' Crucially, in 'inventing the "Concert" they undoubtedly contributed in a very mark degree to the security of Europe.' It was a sotto voce demand for a new form of concert. 64 Woodward's account of the 1878 Berlin Congress was a compendium of sorts to complimented Prothero on the handbooks, which had 'proved extremely valuable' and were 'a glowing testimony' to the work of the Historical Section. 67 But their real value lay in establishing the nature of the problems likely to be settled at the peace conference rather than in producing blue prints for their solution. Indubitably, at Paris, they were used mostly by junior
diplomats. Yet as one of them noted 'no more authoritative, comprehensive or lucid basis of information could possibly have been compiled.' 68 The influence of Prothero's 'manuals', then, was more subtle and is to be found in the details of the 1919 peace settlements than in their grand design. Somewhat naively, Prothero himself had entertained hopes in that direction. A few days before the armistice, Balfour had invited him to attend the peace conference as Historical Adviser on account of his 'admirable work' so far. 69 on the Trentino and that curious relic of the Crimean war, the demilitarised status of the Åland Islands. As for the largest of the breakaway territories, he was certain 'that eventually some form of tie with Great Russia will be recreated. The sooner this takes place the better, since the Great Russians will inevitably be impelled .. 'Peace Papers' was more limited. In fact, he produced only one such paper, on Zionism, in which he stressed 'the connection of this ideal with the general aims of the Entente.' 86 His pro-Zionist sympathies, indeed, involved Webster in a row with the Foreign Office over its 'P. book' on the subject, which he condemned for its hostile bias and its many factual inaccuracies. 87 Webster was MI2(e)'s liaison officer with the PID. That he took up the matter testified as much to the strength of his sympathies for the cause of a Jewish state as to the strength of his relations with the Foreign Office.
In an interesting parallel with Prothero's Historical Section, MI2(e), now renamed MI6(b) began to decline once its 'Peace Papers' had been completed in early 1919. Webster, whose account of the Vienna Congress appeared in January 1919, was determined to leave the War Office once the peace conference had concluded its business. 88 But he and Temperley apart, they were mostly from the PID. Its creation was an early exercise in the central coordination of political intelligence in Whitehall but, just as importantly, it was an essential part of Hardinge's bureaucratic power-grab, though its precise status and, more especially, the question of its permanency, remained unresolved at the moment of creation. 93 With one exception, the historians in it were Oxford-men, invariably from Balliol or New College, and usually with a strong background in the classics or mediaeval history. The exception was Headlam-Morley, the PID's assistant director and its 'doyen'. 94 the Westminster Gazette and then, in 1917, a study of Germany policy on the eve of war followed, in effect a supplement to his earlier book, in which he sought to demonstrate that 'those who defeated the efforts in favour of peace that ... [the German chancellor] began at the eleventh hour' were to be found 'in Berlin'. 98 Headlam-Morley's writings were strongly marked by his classical education and his pre-war civil service experience: 'He was considerate, enlightened, rational and commonsensical, averse from every extreme, from every fanaticism, from any emotional indulgence. Everything he wrote has the same high-minded and rather aloof two rival parties. Based on whatever materials could be procured from Germany, he sought to demonstrate that the chasm between the two was fundamental and ideological at the leadership level, and that it was difficult to see how unity could be restored. He also warned that the breakaway faction grew 'not because the German masses cared for "self-determination of nationalities" or "no annexations" ..., but because bereavements and material discomforts of the war made them want peace above everything else.' The same masses had acquiesced in Anschluss: 'But German influence has to be limited to German land.' However, unless Austria-Hungary was 'dismembered "root and branch" many wars will still have to be fought before we arrive at a stable settlement in that part of the world.' 108 An historian, whose services could not be procured for the PID was Seton-Watson, even though many of its members had connections to his journal. He remained on the fringes of official policy, but was to prove useful during the hiatus between the collapse of the central powers and the peace conference. 109 The PID and MI2(e) nevertheless left an imprint both on Whitehall and on the historical profession. In 1923 Webster noted that during the war 'the Historian was associated increasingly with the practical conduct of affairs, as the area of conflict broadened, and the men of action were confronted with new and startling emergencies.' 121 The war emergency had forced the British government to compensate for its lack of analytical power by recruiting scholars into the war machinery. In that sense, the various intelligence outfits, staffed by historians, were a first attempt at a more holistic approach to policy-making that drew on, and sought to integrate, a wider range of sources of information. Headlam-Morley's services were retained. He succeeded Prothero as Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office. In that role he continued to write background memoranda from an historical perspective. Dispassionate and first-rate, they were, in essence, departmental minutes rather than works of history. 122 Headlam-Morley's role is, perhaps, best understood as that of a 'knowledge manager', whose wide network of academic and official contacts placed him at the heart of various scholarly and public policy projects in the 1920s, not least that of publishing the British documents on the origins of the war. 123 Although the wartime intelligence departments were dismantled, the experiment was deemed to have made a significant contribution to the war effort so that it was revived on the 120. Carr outbreak of the next world war, albeit within certain confines, as Woodward noted wistfully:
It is a queer thing that, in the last war when we were young, we saw the ablest and best of our contemporaries killed as junior officers when they should have been singled out for high military responsibilities, and, in this war, when we have behind us years of experience, and of the exercise of judgment and authority, we cannot get into the key positions controlling policy and executive action within the sphere of our special competence. 124 Perhaps, like Prothero in 1919, Woodward had succumbed to the delusions of grandeur.
Even so, the experience of war-time governmental employment clearly sharpened historians' sense of the realities of international politics and it affected the manner in which they studied and wrote about the past. Both these developments were visible in the creation, on the fringes of the peace conference in May 1919, of the British (later Royal) Institute of International Affairs.
From the beginning it was intended to devote some of its resources to promoting the study of contemporary history with a policy-related purpose. At that inaugural meeting it was also decided to produce a multi-volume compendium on the peace conference, the editorship of which was entrusted to Temperley, who had earned his first editorial spurs as A.W. Ward's amanuensis on the Cambridge Modern History. 125 It was a pioneering project, for no comparable work on a contemporary subject had ever been undertaken before. It was instructive also in another respect. For in inventing contemporary history, it merely poured the old Whig 'One thing is certain, … there is no remedy for the ills of the world if the League does not succeed.' In that event, 'war will come again & a more terrible & devastating war than we can imagine. It can only be averted by a res[olu]te resort to the ways of peace, and for that the only 126 sharpened Zimmern's appreciation of the public responsibility of experts, though he remained true to his Hellenist roots in conceiving of the expert as a quasi-Platonic philosopherconsigliere to the new kings of democracy. 133 Such ideas were at the root of his pioneering initiatives in the field of international education and intellectual cooperation, which contributed to the creation of UNESCO, whose first director Zimmern became in 1946. 134 Toynbee's intellectual development, after a brief and unhappy interlude as the first Koraes professor at King's College London, went in a similar direction. As research director at Chatham House, a position to which Headlam-Morley had helped when he sought escape from feuding Greeks in London, he fostered the study of contemporary affairs with his Annual Surveys; and here his wartime experience alerted him to the pitfalls of the enterprise: 'To give people the benefit of any doubt is particularly advisable for historian when the history with which he is dealing is very recent, because the nature of his evidence makes it impossible for conclusions to be more than tentative.' 135 In later years, he dismissed his wartime writings as 'juvenalia'; and yet in Nationality and the War there are buried the seeds of some of his later arguments about the cyclical rise and fall of cultures in his monumental Study of History:
'Change is a harmonisation of two rhythms -Growth and Decay'. 136 As for those who returned from Whitehall and Paris to history proper, it has sometimes been suggested that the war created diplomatic history. 137 Such blanket judgment requires some refinement and qualification. Temperley and Webster had embarked upon research in diplomatic history before 1914, and indeed had developed ambitious plans for a multi-volume study of British foreign policy. 138 After 1919 Temperley and Webster returned to the fields they had left five years earlier, but they did not simply continue ploughing the furrows they had left in 1914. War had impressed upon them the importance of decision-making processes as well as external forces, especially also now geography. In his inaugural lecture, Temperley suggested that 'by limiting aims, by increasing objectivity, and by abandoning vain speculation' historians could advance knowledge and understanding of the past. 139 This was a kind of 'technical history', later half-praised and half-derided by his pupil Herbert Butterfield, that favoured specialisation and the detailed study of diplomatic documents. Temperley's study of Canning's foreign policy, a far cry from his youthful earlier monograph, was testament to this new approach. It also testified to the formative experience of war: 'Practical experience of war and diplomacy during the years 1914-21 has taught much that no historian could acquire by mere diligence. ... [I]ncreased knowledge of the practice of diplomacy makes one recognise the great difficulties which always beset the practical man, and the much greater difficulties which always beset the historian who has to pass judgment upon him.' 140 Webster, who produced two major tomes on Castlereagh in the decade after the war as well as several important papers on nineteenth-century diplomacy, followed similar precepts. 'The Foreign Office papers are one whole'; and the study of British foreign policy required immersion in a wide range of country files and personal papers. This was a matter of technique. Equally important was an appreciation of the wider systemic context of international politics. In sharp contrast to his two papers on Castlereagh before 1914, which focused entirely on the deeds of the man, the first 120 pages of Webster's monograph were devoted to the domestic context and institutional apparatus within which his subject operated, followed by a detailed sketch of international setting. 141 Seton-Watson, who became the inaugural T.G. Masaryk chair at the newly created
School of Slavonic and East European Studies, remained involved in the affairs of Eastern
Central and South East European affairs. But he also turned his attention to nineteenth-century diplomatic history, for which he utilised the Imperial Russian embassy archives, held in London until their return to the Soviet authorities in 1925. His monograph on the 'Great Eastern Crisis' was a 'technical' history in the Temperley sense, but it was more than that. It contained an ideological core, presenting Disraeli as an exponent of that muddling and misguided 'old diplomacy' that ran aground in 1914 and Gladstone as a forerunner of Geneva-style internationalism. 142 Seton-Watson attempt at a survey of British policy towards the continent during the long nineteenth century was perhaps strong on analysis and ideological drive than technical competence, a defect he himself admitted. He accepted Britain's 'hybrid position', halfin and half-out of Europe, but swept aside as impractical the facile distinction between 'intervention' and 'non-intervention' that for so long bedevilled discussions of foreign policy.
The interests of post-war Britain, he concluded, were 'more worldwide than ever before, and her need for peace is correspondingly greater.' The lesson of the past, then, was that Britain ought to be ready to collaborate with any country, 'but not at the expense of her own free institutions, and only on the basis of international peace and cooperation.' 143 If this left the door open to 'appeasement', he took a forceful anti-Chamberlain position in two further books on current affairs. 144 In the cases of some wartime intelligence officials, the war really did turn them into diplomatic historians. Davis, who returned to Oxford in 1919, abandoned the Middle Ages for the nineteenth century. With his 1926 Raleigh lecture before the British Academy he ventured into historiographical terra incognita, Anglo-Russian competition for control of Central Asia in the first half of the century. 145 Sumner, the most prolific of writers in MI2(e), proved to be a slow writer once ensconced again in the cloisters of academe. He contributed to Temperley's history of the peace conference and was closely involved with Chatham House, but it took him until 1937 before he published his first major work, a study of Russian policy in the Balkans in the 1870s. Based on a mass of mostly published sources in many languages, it was a masterly exercise in that kind of 'technical' history that Temperley had stipulated, mindful of external and internal contexts and of the constraints on decision-makers that arose out of the actions of was, perhaps, that he was a far better analyst of international politics than of the Westminster manoeuvres of eighteenth-century backwoodsmen.
***
The historians examined here would be horrified to discover that that they had anything in common, that they had a uniform outlook on account of joint experiences, or -worse of allthat were part of some 'school'. And yet, just as they brought their scholarly skills and abilities to bear on their wartime work, so the experience of war and government affected the trajectory of their scholarly pursuits after 1919. The war did not create diplomatic history. But the war gave it a deeper meaning and firmer and more rigorous contours. The light of history shone in both directions.
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